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FEDERAL INCOME TAX-EXCEPTIONS TO DEFINITION OF CAPI-
TAL ASSET ARE NARROWED. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner,
108 S. Ct. 971 (1988).
Arkansas Best is a diversified holding company. In 1968 it ac-
quired approximately sixty-five percent of the stock of National Bank
of Commerce (NBC) in Dallas, Texas. It continued to acquire addi-
tional shares through 1974. Until 1972, the bank was growing and
prosperous. In 1972, as a result of the collapse of the real estate mar-
ket in Dallas, federal examiners classified NBC as a problem bank.'
Arkansas Best's stock acquisitions after 1972 were attempts to pre-
vent the failure of the bank and preserve Arkansas Best's business
reputation. Arkansas Best sold the bulk of its investment in NBC in
1975 at a loss of almost ten million dollars. It treated the loss as an
ordinary loss, 2 rather than a capital loss,3 for income tax purposes.
The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the or-
dinary loss deduction and treated the loss as a capital loss. Capital
loss treatment limited the amount of the immediate deduction to Ar-
kansas Best.4 The tax court, relying on principles set forth in Corn
Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,' held that the stock purchased
before 1972 was purchased with an investment purpose and therefore
the loss on those shares was a capital loss. The shares purchased after
1972, however, were purchased with the "business purpose" of pro-
tecting Arkansas Best's business reputation and the sale of those
shares gave rise to ordinary loss treatment. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that all of the loss was a capital
loss because the NBC stock did not fall within any of the exceptions
to the definition of a capital asset.6 The United States Supreme Court
1. "When a bank has more than [fifty] percent of its loan portfolio classified as weak
loans, the bank is considered a problem bank." Arkansas Best Corp. v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 640,
647 (1984).
2. The Internal Revenue Code states that "the term 'ordinary loss' includes any loss
from the sale or exchange of property which is not a capital asset." 26 U.S.C. § 65 (1982).
3. A capital loss is a loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. 26 U.S.C. § 1211
(1982).
4. For corporations, capital losses may be deducted only to the extent of capital gains.
26 U.S.C. § 1211(a) (1982).
5. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
6. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Comm'r, 800 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1986). 26 U.S.C. § 1221
(1982) provides:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by the
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affirmed the Eighth Circuit's finding and rejected the business-motive
test 7 as an exception to the statutory definition of a capital asset. Ar-
kansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 S. Ct. 971 (1988).
The 1921 Revenue Act' was the first income tax act to tax gains
from the sale of capital assets at rates lower than those for other in-
come. At that time, this preferential treatment applied only to indi-
viduals, not to corporations.9 A corporation's capital gains remained
taxable as ordinary income until 1942.10 The 1934 Revenue Act"
placed a limitation on the amount of capital losses that could offset
ordinary income. This provision applied to both individuals and cor-
porations. 12 Because of these provisions, taxpayers preferred to have
taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not
include-
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would prop-
erly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the
taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of his trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to the
allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in his
trade or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memoran-
dum, or similar property, held by-
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property,
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property, a taxpayer for
whom such property was prepared or produced, or
(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is determined, for
purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or in part
by reference to the basis of such property in the hands of a taxpayer de-
scribed in subparagraph (A) or (B);
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or busi-
ness for services rendered or from the sale of property described in paragraph
(1);
(5) a publication of the United States Government (including the Congressional
Record) which is received from the United States Government or any agency
thereof, other than by purchase at the price at which it is offered for sale to the
public, and which is held by-
(A) a taxpayer who so received such publication, or
(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such publication is determined,
for purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or in
part by reference to the basis of such publication in the hands of a taxpayer
described in subparagraph (A).
7. The Eighth Circuit, in applying the business motive test, stated that "capital stock
acquired for business purposes is classified as an ordinary asset, and capital stock acquired for
investment purposes is classified as a capital asset." Arkansas Best Corp., 800 F.2d at 220
(citing Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145, 1166 (Ct. Cl. 1971)).
8. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227.
9. J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.02, at 13 n.l (1986).
10. Id.
11. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, 48 Stat. 680.
12. J. MERTENS, supra note 9, at 10.
380
DEFINITION OF CAPITAL ASSET
gains classified as capital gains (to obtain lower tax rates) and losses
classified as ordinary losses (to avoid the limitation on the amount of
capital loss deductible).
The Internal Revenue Code defines capital assets by exclusion.' 3
Capital assets include all property except (1) inventory, (2) deprecia-
ble or real property used in a trade or business, (3) copyrights, other
artistic creations, or letters, (4) trade receivables, or (5) certain United
States government publications. 4 Any property not falling in one of
these classifications is a capital asset.
The courts, however, carved out some non-statutory exceptions
to the definition of a capital asset. In a 1941 case,' 5 the Supreme
Court held that a payment for cancellation of a lease was not a capital
transaction. The Court assumed that the lease was "property," but
nevertheless held that payment for the cancellation of the lease was
not a return of capital. The payment was a substitute for rental pay-
ments and it was "immaterial that for some purposes the contract
creating the rights to such payments may be treated as 'property' or
'capital.' 
"6
The 1955 Corn Products case' 7 also involved a property transac-
tion where the property did not fall in any of the statutory exclusions
in the definition of a capital asset. Corn Products used corn in its
manufacturing process. To assure an adequate supply of corn, the
company would regularly purchase corn futures."i If shortages of
corn occurred, it would sell the futures contracts only after acquiring
corn directly in the market. If no shortage occurred, the company
would take delivery on enough of the futures contracts to supply its
manufacturing needs and sell the remaining contracts.' 9 In 1940, the
company had profits on its futures transactions of $680,000. Corn
Products reported this as ordinary income, but later contended that
the futures were capital assets.2°
The Supreme Court held that the futures transactions were an
integral part of Corn Products' manufacturing operation and there-
fore not entitled to capital asset treatment.2 The Court admitted that
13. 26 U.S.C. § 1221 (1982).
14. Id. See supra note 6.
15. Hort v. Comm'r, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
16. Id. at 31.
17. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
18. "A commodity future is a contract to purchase some fixed amount of a commodity at
a future date for a fixed price." Id. at 47 n. 1.
19. Id. at 48-49.
20. Id. at 49.
21. Id. at 50.
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the futures did not fall within the literal language of any of the exclu-
sions to the definition of a capital asset2 2 but held that Congress in-
tended that transactions from the everyday operation of a business be
considered ordinary income or loss.2 3 The Court stated that "[tihe
preferential treatment [of capital gains] applies to transactions in
property which are not the normal source of business income."24
Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) officially indi-
cated situations in which ordinary income or loss would result from
transactions that might appear to involve capital assets. 25 First, a tax-
payer might purchase a minority interest in a corporation to assure
availability of inventory if the right to purchase inventory vested in
the owner of the corporate stock. Second, a taxpayer might purchase
government bonds that are placed in escrow to guarantee perform-
ance on a contract. Finally, a taxpayer might purchase debentures of
a supplier if the debenture assured the taxpayer a specific proportion
of the supplier's production of an inventory item temporarily in short
supply. 26 The IRS contemplated that these situations involved short-
term arrangements and that the stock or securities involved would be
disposed of within a relatively short period of time.27
In later cases, however, purchases of stock in another corpora-
tion often involved a majority interest and/or were often for relatively
long periods of time.28 Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Commissioner 29 in-
volved the building of a foundry by the taxpayer and two other com-
panies to insure a supply of a certain type of iron during the Korean
War. The taxpayer received iron from the foundry for twenty-one
months and held its stock for an additional six months.3 0 Upon the
sale of the foundry's stock, Electrical Fittings claimed an ordinary
loss while the IRS contended the loss should be a capital loss.3' The
tax court stated that the tax treatment of the loss depended upon the
purpose for which the taxpayer acquired it. 32 The court stated that
22. Id. at 51.
23. Id. at 52.
24. Id.
25. Rev. Rul. 58-40, 1958-1 C.B. 275.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 276.
28. See, e.g., Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (two
taxpayers each owned one-half of a supplier subsidiary); W.W. Windle Co. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.
694 (1976) (involved a 72% ownership interest that lasted eight years), appeal dismissed, 550
F.2d 43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977).
29. 33 T.C. 1026 (1960).
30. Id. at 1027-29.
31. Id. at 1030.
32. Id. at 1031.
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"stock purchased in the ordinary course of business where the only
purpose is to insure a vital source of inventory is not a capital asset,
and the loss upon its sale is deductible from ordinary income."33 The
court noted that no investment motive was present since the taxpayer
owned no other securities, all of the foundry's output was sold to its
stockholders, the taxpayer would have been unable to obtain the in-
ventory but for the ownership in the foundry, and "[t]he stock was
held by the [taxpayer] only as long as reasonably necessary under the
practical considerations involved."34
In Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States3" the Court of Claims
established the test that would apply in many future cases. Booth and
another company purchased stock in a paper mill to insure an ade-
quate supply of newsprint.36 A severe shortage of newsprint existed
in the newspaper industry.37 The companies held their stock from
late 1947 until early 1954 when they were able to assure themselves of
a supply of newsprint through long-term contracts with one of their
regular suppliers.38 Booth sold the stock of the paper mill at a loss of
$620,000 and deducted that amount on its 1954 tax return, but the
IRS contended the loss was a capital loss.3 9 The court stated that
securities purchased and held until their sale as an "integral and nec-
essary" act in the conduct of business would create a business expense
or ordinary loss if sold at a loss.' ° However, if "an investment pur-
pose [is] found to have motivated the purchase or holding of the se-
curities, any loss ... must be treated in accord with the capital asset
provisions of the Code."'"
The court noted that the intentions of the taxpayer both at the
time of the original purchase and at the time the taxpayer disposed of
the securities were critical.42 The court also stated that "[t]he fact
that securities are 'property,' in the broad sense of the term, is not
conclusive."43 In Booth's circumstances, the court held that a busi-
ness motivation, rather than an investment motivation, existed and
therefore allowed a deduction in the year of sale as either a business
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. CI. 1962).
36. Id. at 918.
37. Id. at 917.
38. Id. at 918-19.
39. Id. at 919.






expense or an ordinary loss."
The Court of Claims clarified the business versus investment test
in Dearborn Co. v. United States.45 Dearborn, a furniture company,
acquired stock in a woodworking company, Munising, to secure con-
trol of Munising's production facilities and because Munising had a
four and one-half year contract for supplies of hardwood timber.
Hardwood was in short supply at the time.46 However, the court
found that Dearborn was also motivated by (1) its desire to operate
Munising as a permanent, profitable business, (2) the opportunity of
dividend income from Munising, and (3) the desire to earn income
from management fees to be paid by Munising.4 ' The court held that,
while the principal reason for the acquisition may have been a busi-
ness purpose, substantial investment purposes were also present and
"the presence of substantial investment purpose and intent is fatal to
[the taxpayer's] case." 48
The IRS, in a 1975 ruling, 49 stated that the determination as to
whether the sale of stock results in ordinary, as opposed to capital,
gain or loss "depends upon whether the taxpayer purchased and held
the stock with a predominant business motive as distinguished from a
predominant investment motive."" ° The IRS had thus taken a posi-
tion that differed from the holding in Dearborn that any substantial
investment motive controlled even if the principal (or predominant)
reason was business motivated.
In W. W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner,"' the tax court followed
the Court of Claims' reasoning. Windle processed and sold wool
materials used by manufacturers of woolen cloth. Because many of
the mills that were Windle's customers had gone out of business, Win-
dle agreed to organize a company to operate a woolen mill. 2 Windle
viewed the mill as a captive customer but also expected that the value
of its investment would increase over time. 3 When the stock became
worthless, Windle claimed an ordinary deduction for the loss.5 4
44. Id. at 921-22.
45. 444 F.2d 1145 (Ct. CI. 1971).
46. Id. at 1147.
47. Id. at 1148.
48. Id.
49. Rev. Rul. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 67.
50. Id. at 68.
51. W.W. Windle Co. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 694 (1976), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977).
52. Id. at 695-96.
53. Id. at 697.
54. Id. at 704.
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Noting the cases where losses on sale of stock had been afforded
ordinary loss treatment, the court stated, "we deal here with a judge-
made addition to the statutory categories of noncapital assets, and we
are not compelled by the case law to broaden such categories more
than is required under a fair reading of Corn Products and other
precedents.""5 The court then stated that it was "persuaded to hold
that stock purchased with a substantial investment purpose is a capi-
tal asset even if there is a more substantial business motive for the
purchase."56 The court held that Windle's loss was a capital loss be-
cause while its "principal motive was to acquire a captive customer, it
had a substantial subsidiary investment motive, which prevented it
from being entitled to an ordinary loss."" While the IRS argued and
won in W. W. Windle on the basis of the substantial investment motive
test, the tax court noted that the IRS's position was inconsistent with
its opinion in Revenue Ruling 75-1358 which had supported the pre-
dominant motive test. 9
Bell Fibre Products Corp.' saw a reversal of what had been the
usual role of the IRS and taxpayers. In Bell Fibre, the company sold
its investments in a materials supplier and a transportation supplier at
a substantial gain. The taxpayer wanted the gain treated as capital
gain while the IRS argued that ordinary income resulted.6" The tax
court found that the predominant motive for the investment was to
acquire a dependable source of supply. However, a secondary, but
substantial motive was to realize a profit on the investment. 62 The
IRS argued that Revenue Ruling 75-13 should control and that the
predominant motive test should apply. The tax court noted that the
IRS was now trying to take a position inconsistent with the Windle
case.6 3 The court stated that the predominant motive was not the
standard but that "[tihe test is whether [the taxpayer] had a 'substan-
tial investment motive.' "I Since a substantial investment motive did
exist, the court held for the taxpayer that a capital gain resulted.65
The tax court continued its criticism of the IRS by stating that "[i]f
55. Id. at 712.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 704.
58. 1975-1 C.B. 67.
59. W. W. Windle Co., 65 T.C. at 709 n.14.
60. 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 77,042 (1977).
61. Id. at 77-186.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 77-187, n.9.
64. Id. at 77-187.
65. Id. at 77-188.
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there is any uncertainty or whipsawing in the current status of trans-
actions such as are involved herein, it is in no small measure due to
[the IRS's] apparent inability to delineate a consistent position."66
The IRS officially changed its position in 1978.67 Noting the de-
cisions in W. W. Windle68 and Bell Fibre,69 the IRS revoked Revenue
Ruling 75-1370 and took the position that "even a predominant busi-
ness motive cannot preclude the stock from capital gain or loss treat-
ment, as long as there was a substantial investment motive for
acquiring or holding the stock. '71 The IRS officially maintained this
position until the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Arkansas Best
case.
72
In Campbell Taggart, Inc. v. United States73 the Fifth Circuit
considered the issue of whether a holding company could treat a loss
on the sale of stock as an ordinary loss. The IRS argued that a hold-
ing or investment company, because it was not directly involved in
business operations, could never have a "business purpose.' '74 The
court stated that it did "not think that ... a pure holding company
can never avail itself of the Corn Products doctrine. ' 75 It held "that
Corn Products can apply, if the trier of fact is convinced that there
was no investment purpose, when a holding company acquires an as-
set as an indirect means of incurring what would otherwise be a de-
ductible business expense."'76  Because the stock was acquired to
protect Campbell-Taggart's business reputation, the court affirmed
the district court's holding of ordinary loss treatment.77
In Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner78 the taxpayer argued to
the Supreme Court that Corn Products stood for the proposition that
assets acquired for ordinary business purposes should be given ordi-
66. Id.
67. Rev. Rul. 78-94, 1978-1 C.B. 58.
68. W.W. Windle Co. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 694 (1976), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977).
69. 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 77,042 (1977).
70. Rev. Rul. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 67.
71. Rev. Rul. 78-94, 1978-1 C.B. 58.
72. The IRS suspended its prior Revenue Rulings applying Corn Products in Notice 87-
68, 1987-2 C.B. 378. This notice was issued after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Arkansas Best.
73. 744 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1984).
74. Id. at 451.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 446, 460.
78. 108 S. Ct. 971 (1988).
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nary gain or loss treatment. 79 Admitting that there was much support
for that interpretation in both court cases and academic literature, the
Supreme Court then observed that "[u]nfortunately . . . this broad
reading finds no support in the language of [section] 1221. " 8 The
Court rejected the view that the motivation for the acquisition of an
asset determines its status. Using the business motive test, the Court
observed, would be "in direct conflict with the parenthetical phrase
'whether or not connected with his trade or business' "I" contained in
section 1221. That broad definition makes irrelevant the connection
of the property with a taxpayer's trade or business while the business
purpose test "would make this factor dispositive."82 The Court dis-
tinguished cases involving lease payments and other accretions to the
value of a capital asset being treated as ordinary income on the prem-
ise that section 1221 "property" does not include claims or rights to
ordinary income."3 Thus, those cases did not involve an expansion of
the statutory exceptions to the definition of a capital asset.
The Court stated that the five exceptions to the general definition
of capital assets were exclusive rather than illustrative.84 It observed
that both the legislative history and the applicable Treasury regula-
tion supported that interpretation. 5
Turning to the decision in Corn Products,6 the Arkansas Best
Court said that it was convinced that the earlier Court had treated the
corn futures as substitutes for the corn inventory.87 Therefore, while
not part of the "actual inventory," their use as an integral part of the
inventory-purchase system justified their treatment as "property of a
kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the tax-
payer" under section 1221.8 The Court concluded that "Corn Prod-
ucts is properly interpreted as standing for the narrow proposition
that hedging transactions that are an integral part of a business' in-
ventory-purchase system fall within the inventory exclusion of Section
1221.",89
The Court noted the abuse that could exist under the business




83. Id. at 974-75 n.5.
84. Id. at 975.
85. Id.
86. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
87. 108 S. Ct. at 977.
88. Id. at 976-77.
89. Id. at 977.
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purpose versus investment motive standard.90 If the stock transaction
resulted in a gain, the taxpayer would claim an investment motive and
claim capital gain treatment.9' If a loss resulted, the taxpayer would
claim no investment motive and claim an ordinary loss. 9 2 Arkansas
Best even admitted that had the stock sold at a gain, it planned to
claim capital gain treatment.93 Since the Court was now holding that
"a taxpayer's motivation in purchasing an asset is irrelevant" in deter-
mining whether the asset was a capital asset,94 the possibility of abuse
would be limited.95
The Tax Reform Act of 198696 effectively repealed the preferen-
tial treatment of long-term capital gains.97 As a result, there generally
would be no dispute currently between the IRS and a taxpayer that
had a gain resulting from the sale of an asset.98 In a case such as Bell
Fibre,99 the results would not differ if the gain was ordinary income or
capital gain.
However, the 1986 Act established maximum rates on net capital
gains for both individuals' ° and corporations. 10' If tax rates were
increased by future legislation (and these provisions were not
amended at the same time), preferential treatment for net capital
gains (and potential for disputes as to the nature of gains on the sale
of assets) would again exist.
Perhaps more importantly, limits still exist on the deductibility
of capital losses. Individuals can generally deduct capital losses only




93. Id. at 977-78. See Arkansas Best Corp. v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 640, 647-48 (1984).
94. 108 S. Ct. at 978.
95. Id. at 977.
96. Act of Oct. 22, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
97. Id. Section 301(a) repealed § 1202 (26 U.S.C. § 1202 (1982)) which had allowed an
individual taxpayer a deduction of 60% of the amount of net capital. gain. Section 311(a)
changed the alternate capital gain rate for corporations from 28% to 34%. Since this is equal
to a corporation's highest tax rate (excluding a 5% surtax), no tax advantage to capital gains is
provided. 26 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. IV 1986).
98. However, if a taxpayer already has a capital loss for the year, a capital gain would be
preferable over an ordinary gain since the taxpayer could use the existing capital loss to offset
the capital gain.
99. 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 77,042 (1977).
100. Act of Oct. 22, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, § 302(a) added § 1(j). 26
U.S.C. § 1(j) (Supp. IV 1986).
101. Id. § 311(a), amended § 1201(a). 26 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
102. 26 U.S.C. § 1211 (b) (1982). Non-corporate taxpayers are allowed a carryforward of
unused capital losses for an indefinite period. 26 U.S.C. § 1212(b) (1982).
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can deduct capital losses only to the extent of capital gains. 0 3 In
those cases involving the sale of assets at a loss, a great deal could be
at stake in the determination as to whether those losses were ordinary
or capital in nature. The cases involving this dispute and invoking the
Corn Products" doctrine on the taxpayer's behalf have involved sub-
stantial losses.
The holding in Arkansas Best will effectively preclude taxpayers
from claiming ordinary loss deductions from the sale of corporate
stock or other investment assets. Arkansas Best eliminates what
might have been called the "business purpose with no substantial in-
vestment motivation" exception to the statutory definition of capital
assets.
The courts have been concerned with the uncertainty that is cre-
ated by the exception that seemed to have been established by Corn
Products.05 The tax court in W. W Windle," 6 for example, refused to
adopt the predominant motive test because it "would thereby be even
more greatly expanding the 'gray area' of uncertainty and contro-
versy."'0 7 The Fifth Circuit noted that legislative solutions to the
problem had been suggested, one of them being that taxpayers, at the
time of acquisition, be required to declare their purpose in holding
stock.'0 8 The Supreme Court both in Corn Products'09 and Arkansas
Best 110 expressed concern about the ability of a taxpayer to determine
the tax treatment after gain or loss had been established.
Arkansas Best establishes that the sale of stock or other invest-
ment assets at a loss results in a capital loss (with the exception of the
inventory of a securities dealer).'1 ' The rule is clear, and neither the
IRS nor the courts will have to inquire as to the motivation of the
taxpayer in acquiring and/or holding the asset. The decision means
that a number of taxpayers who won earlier cases based on the moti-
vation test would have clearly lost under the Arkansas Best standard.
103. 26 U.S.C. § 121 l(a) (1982). Corporations are allowed to carry unused capital losses
back three years and forward five years. 26 U.S.C. § 1212(a) (1982).
104. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
105. Id.
106. W.W. Windle Co. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 694 (1976).
107. Id. at 713.
108. Campbell Taggart, Inc. v. United States, 744 F.2d 442, 458 n.50. I.R.C. § 1236 re-
quires securities dealers to identify clearly in their records and on the day it was acquired any
security intended as an investment. 26 U.S.C. § 1236(a) and (b) (1982).
109. 350 U.S. at 53-54.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
111. 26 U.S.C. § 1236(a), (b) (1982).
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But just as clearly, the Court has provided a simple, straightforward
rule to both taxpayers and the IRS.
Mike Watts
